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Biolinguistics is the study of language from a biological point of view. As the 
Special Issue—Biolinguistic Research in the 21st Century of Biolinguistics shows, this 
area of study can be approached from different perspectives: aspects of language 
evolution (Wacewicz et al. 2020; Mendívil-Giró 2020), ethology and cross-species 
comparisons (Schalz & Dickins 2020), and neural network analysis (Collins 2020) 
are some of them. Instead of presenting a brief overview of these works, we will 
use this editorial article to illustrate a more valuable and often overlooked point, 
namely, that another perspective to the study of language from a biological point 
of view is the one that goes through theoretical linguistics. Any study in 
theoretical linguistics that strives for explanatory adequacy in terms of the innate 
primitives it assumes falls within the domain of biolinguistics. Although some 
theoretical linguists explicitly distance themselves from biolinguistics, the 
question of ‘What is innate in language behavior?’ as well as any discussion that 
evokes innate characteristics is contributing towards a biological theory of lang-
uage. This is not an original claim; it is how Eric Lenneberg chose to close the last 
chapter of his ground-breaking book Biological Foundations of Language (Lenneberg 
1967).  
 Some of the questions that Lenneberg addressed regarding innate features 
and cross-linguistic variation are still looking for answers today. One example 
comes from the first two live debates in a series of video conferences called 
“Linguistics Flash-Mobs. Epic Battles in History”, which started in May 2020. In 
each meeting, two scholars are invited to discuss longstanding theoretical issues 
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in linguistics. In the first debate, two theoretical linguists, Giuseppe Longobardi 
and Ian Roberts, addressed the topic of parameters and parametric variation. 
Roberts posed a critical question that summarizes perfectly (i) our current under-
standing of the set of features languages grammaticalize and (ii) why these 
features are selected for grammaticalization instead of others. In his words, 
“which (sub)set of formal features is underspecified is a question that is very diffi-
cult to answer in part because we don’t really know what a set of formal features 
is” (Roberts 2020). Addressing this matter, Luigi Rizzi argued that “clearly 
U[niversal] G[rammar] must say something about the set of formal features. A 
rather elementary empirical observation is that of all the properties that are 
cognitively salient or perceptually salient only a very small subset is actually 
grammatical[ized]” (Rizzi 2020). 
 To sum up, the argument is that languages grammaticalize only a subset of 
features and the link that Rizzi established is between UG, as the locus of the 
features that have been selected for grammaticalization, and parameterization, as 
the process that accounts for the cross-linguistically variable values of these 
features. Rizzi also gave a useful example to illustrate the difference between 
grammaticalized and non-grammaticalized features. In his words, “something 
like physical shape can be grammaticalized, as many systems of nominal 
categories may refer to shape, but no language, to the best of our knowledge, may 
refer to color. There is no agreement for yellow objects” (Rizzi 2020). As Ian 
Roberts observed, one then faces the following question when addressing this 
topic: Why doesn’t UG encode a color agreement feature?  
 Before addressing this question—a question which according to Roberts has 
not received an answer yet—, it is useful to bring into the picture the second live 
debate of the “Linguistics Flash-Mobs. Epic Battles in History” series. This debate 
featured again two theoretical linguists, Peter Svenonius and Guglielmo Cinque, 
who discussed an issue that is conceptually related to the topic of the first debate: 
functional hierarchies. One of the very first points that Cinque raised related to 
why we find that only some functional elements are encoded grammatically in all 
languages. He further argued that our cognitive system is quite rich and involves 
many notions that are not coded grammatically (Cinque 2020). His conclusion, 
formed on the basis of these observations, echoed Rizzi’s conclusion in the first 
debate: UG must encode the toolkit of features that languages grammaticalize. 
 Indeed, studies in crosslinguistic variation attest to the fact that the vast 
majority of languages grammatically represent certain notions (for example, 
Tense or Aspect), but not others (for example, whether something is poisonous). 
The research questions that emerge in this context are the following two: 
 
RQ 1: Does the observation that certain notions are grammaticalized, while others 
are not, offer an argument in favor of a rich UG that encodes the relevant 
features?  
 
RQ 2: Why does UG (or language in general, if one does not link the presence of 
this feature toolkit with UG) grammatically encode specific features, but not 
others that are equally salient from a cognitive point of view (e.g., color)? 
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2. A Rich UG? 
Undoubtedly, there are restrictions in the pool of features that languages 
grammaticalize. However, the conclusion that several scholars, including Rizzi 
and Cinque, reach on the basis of this premise, namely, that UG dictates the set of 
grammaticalized features, does not follow as a logical conclusion. The observation 
that certain notions are consistently grammaticalized across languages only 
entails that languages tend to grammaticalize certain markers, but not others. The 
reasons for this may have nothing to do with UG. How Homo sapiens evolved 
towards a phenotype that is able to process and encode specific grammatical 
markers is an empirical question. A rich and highly detailed UG entails a rigid 
system, and this is less desirable for a developmental process like language 
development, that follows a nonlinear trajectory and shows abrupt transitions 
(Ruhland & van Geert 1998; Ninio 2006; Corominas-Murtra et al. 2009; Bassano et 
al. 2011; Barceló-Coblijn et al. 2012). A system that is flexible enough can reach the 
mature state more easily than a very detailed, rigid system. From this perspective, 
it would be surprising if brains show ontogenetic plasticity, but develop rigid 
cognitive systems. An innate large set of highly detailed features or patterns 
would also be problematic for language acquisition. When humans have to learn 
artificial, highly detailed and specific languages, the chosen strategy by the 
learners tends to be an adaptation and reduction of the features towards under-
specification of meanings (Kirby et al. 2008).  
  Another challenge for the proponents of the position that UG encodes the 
set of features that languages grammaticalize boils down to the fact that, unlike 
what RQ 1 may imply, languages do vary as to which features they grammati-
calize. For example, if the Tense category is understood as a verb inflection that 
specifies TIME, spoken languages largely conform with this pattern, but verbs in 
sign languages often do not inflect for tense. Rather, temporal information is 
conveyed by time adverbials and/or is inferred from the context (Aarons et al. 
1995; Pfau & Steinbach 2006). Clearly, languages vary in terms of the grammatical 
markers they employ, and they also vary in relation to the strategies they use for 
expressing the same notion (i.e. grammaticalization or lexicalization). If TIME can 
be variably expressed across languages through an adverbial, an inflectional 
marker, or background information, can this notion be removed from the 
hypothetical UG toolkit that specifies the subset of formal features that are 
grammaticalized? Put another way, if this notion is expressed in some languages 
in the absence of any dedicated grammatical marker, this feature is potentially 
grammaticalizable, but not necessarily grammaticalized across all the languages 
in which it is expressed. It thus seems that RQ 1 must be amended as follows, in 
order to make reference to notions that are grammaticalizable, but not necessarily 
grammaticalized: Does the observation that certain notions are grammaticaliz-
able, while others are not, offer an argument in favor of a rich UG that encodes 
the relevant features? This reformulation of the question puts the matter in its 
right dimension but brings forward a major problem. It has not been shown that 
features like COLOR or BRIGHTNESS cannot be grammaticalized. What has been 
observed is that formal grammars do not develop grammatical markers for such 
notions (Cinque 2013; Adger 2018; Sigurðsson 2020). This suffices to give a 
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negative answer to RQ 1, because (i) the possibility that COLOR or POISON can be 
grammatically expressed and the relevant markers successfully acquired has not 
been discarded and (ii) even if (i) is established, it is not necessary that it is UG 
that precludes the grammaticalization of certain markers. As the next section will 
show, several other explanations can be given as to why some features are not 
grammaticalized, such as adaptation pressures towards input simplification as 
well as notion-specific semantic restrictions that may favor lexicalization over 
grammaticalization. 
 
3. Why Not [±poisonous]? 
The question that emerges next is why languages don’t grammaticalize [±poison-
ous] or [±bright] if in principle these notions are grammaticalizable. RQ 2 phrases 
this in a more general way by asking why languages grammatically encode 
specific features, but not others that may be equally salient from a cognitive point 
of view. Recall that versions of this question have been voiced as lending support 
to the idea that if [±poisonous] and other notions are not grammaticalized, it must 
be the case that UG encodes a toolkit of features from which languages variably 
choose what to grammaticalize (i.e., not all languages have a grammatical marker 
for evidentiality, although potentially they could in the sense that this is a gram-
maticalizable, learnable marker).  
 One answer to RQ 2 is that the semantics of [±poisonous] is not a good 
candidate for an atomic semantic primitive in the first place. It is an endpoint, not 
a building block.1 A second answer is that any evolved feature must serve a 
purpose (like any selected trait for an organism) such as facilitating successful 
reference in some respect. Having a grammatical marker for poison would not 
serve any such purpose, so from a biolinguistic point of view it would be 
superfluous and unlikely to ever develop. Of course, describing whether some-
thing is poisonous or not is extremely useful in any community, but languages do 
not need to express this through a grammatical marker, whereas they often need 
to grammaticalize past and present tense for obvious reasons of time reference 
any time an event is described. A third answer has to do with learnability 
considerations. A grammatical marker that encodes [±poisonous] would probably 
fail to be re-transmitted by learners even in cases of iterated learning in artificial 
language learning tasks, precisely because it would be useless in most contexts.  
A fourth answer relates the existence of formal features with the evolution-
ary origins of our species. A number of scholars have argued that only concepts 
that predate the emergence of Homo sapiens are candidates for formal features 
(Emonds 2011; Golston 2018; Panagiotidis 2021). Emonds (2011) presents this 
hypothesis in the following way. 
 
(1) Emonds’ anti-correlation hypothesis 
Almost all concepts F of human syntax are among those plausibly associ-
ated with the cognition of highly developed non-human primates, precisely 
those who lack syntax. 
 
1 This observation is due to Gillian Ramchand, offered during a Twitter exchange.  
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This answer seems to suffer from two problems. First, as Emonds (2011) 
argues, many grammatical features of human language are indeed present in the 
communication systems of other primates (e.g., ANIMATE). Although this is 
largely true for animacy, the same cannot be argued for all features that human 
language can grammaticalize. One example is evidentiality. Defined as the 
linguistic designation of source of information for a belief, evidentiality has been 
described as the linguistic coding of epistemology (Chafe & Nichols 1986). 
Languages differ in the way they grammatically encode their evidential markers 
across many dimensions. The first and most fundamental difference is that, 
although all languages have a way to indicate source of evidence for an utterance, 
only a quarter of them have a grammatical system of specific markers for 
encoding it (Aikhenvald 2004). These markers can denote source of evidence (i.e., 
hearsay, inferential, dubitative), modality of source (i.e., auditory, visual), and 
degree of certainty. According to Emonds’ anti-correlation hypothesis (1), the 
prediction is that such notions are expressed in the repertoire of other species. 
However, the use of the “hearsay” evidential, for example, would entail the 
transition from a direct predator alarm call (i.e., ‘predator X is close’) to a 
“reported speech” predator alarm call (i.e., ‘I heard/they say/it is reported that 
predator X is close’), something that contradicts our current understanding of 
animal cognition, which has been argued to not provide evidence of hierarchically 
organized structure learning (Petkov & ten Cate 2020).  
The second problem with Emonds’ anti-correlation hypothesis is that it 
predicts that notions that are not grammaticalized in human language must be 
absent from the cognition of other primates. For example, he argues that is highly 
doubtful that other species classify the activities of others as respectful, generous, 
or selfish. Again, results from recent animal studies do not seem to borne out this 
prediction. For instance, some works suggest that domestic dogs could be able to 
recognize generous and selfish people and later express this as a systematic pre-
ference in choice tests (Carballo et al. 2015). Other works report that chimpanzees 
could also be able to infer the reputation of humans as selfish or generous agents, 
perhaps also expressing systematic preferences for generous donors over selfish 
ones (Subiaul et al. 2008).  
Going back to RQ 2, [±poisonous] is not a good candidate for a grammatical 
marker in human language for at least three reasons that are not related to the 
anti-correlation hypothesis in (1). At the same time, POISONOUS is a good candi-
date for a lexical item in the repertoire of both other species (e.g., chimpanzees 
produce different type of grunts when encountering different types of food; 
Slocombe & Zuberbühler 2006) and humans. 
 
4. Outlook 
This work focused on two questions that are often addressed within the realm of 
theoretical linguistics: 1. Why languages consistently (do not) grammaticalize a 
subset of cognitive notions, and 2. Whether this observation justifies the 
conclusion that Universal Grammar must encode a toolkit of grammaticalizable 
features. The first question received several explanations. Learning consider-
ations, adaptation constraints, and semantic restrictions that may make a notion 
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a better candidate for lexicalization instead of grammaticalization are some of the 
reasons that explain why TENSE is a good candidate for the development of a 
grammatical marker, but COLOR or POISON are not.  
The second question was answered negatively: Contrary to popular claims 
within cartography, it has not been established that it is UG that precludes the 
grammaticalization of certain markers. Providing the bigger picture, the take-
home message is that these are empirical questions that show how theoretical 
linguistics and biolinguistics are conceptually connected, such that addressing 
long-standing debates in theoretical linguistics inevitably goes through discus-
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